

1 **Title:** Shrinkage in serial intervals across cluster transmission generations of COVID-19

2

3 Shi Zhao^{1,2,*}, Yu Zhao³, Biao Tang^{4,5}, Daozhou Gao⁶, Zihao Guo¹, Marc KC Chong^{1,2}, Salihu S
4 Musa^{7,8}, Yongli Cai⁹, Weiming Wang⁹, Daihai He^{7,*}, and Maggie H Wang^{1,2}

5

6 **1** JC School of Public Health and Primary Care, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong,
7 China

8 **2** CUHK Shenzhen Research Institute, Shenzhen, China

9 **3** School of Public Health and Management, Ningxia Medical University, Yinchuan, Ningxia, China

10 **4** School of Mathematics and Statistics, Xi'an Jiaotong University, Xi'an, China

11 **5** Laboratory for Industrial and Applied Mathematics, Department of Mathematics and Statistics,
12 York University, Toronto, ON M3J 1P3, Canada

13 **6** Department of Mathematics, Shanghai Normal University, Shanghai, China

14 **7** Department of Applied Mathematics, Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hong Kong, China

15 **8** Department of Mathematics, Kano University of Science and Technology, Wudil, Nigeria

16 **9** School of Mathematics and Statistics, Huaiyin Normal University, Huaian, China

17 * Correspondence to: zhaoshi.cmsa@gmail.com (SZ), or daihai.he@polyu.edu.hk (DH).

18

19 **Email addresses of all authors**

20 SZ: zhaoshi.cmsa@gmail.com; YZ: zhaoyuzy123@163.com; BT: btang66@yorku.ca; DG:
21 dzgao@shnu.edu.cn; ZG: guozihao9602@163.com; MKCC: marc@cuhk.edu.hk; SSM: [salihu-](mailto:salihu-sabiu.musa@connect.polyu.hk)
22 sabiu.musa@connect.polyu.hk; YC: yonglicai@hytc.edu.cn; WW: weimingwang2003@163.com;
23 DH: daihai.he@polyu.edu.hk; MHW: maggiew@cuhk.edu.hk.

24

25

26 **Abstract**

27 The COVID-19 pandemic poses a serious threat to global health, and one of the key
28 epidemiological factors that shape the transmission of COVID-19 is its serial interval (SI). Although
29 SI is commonly considered following a probability distribution at a population scale, slight
30 discrepancies in SI across different transmission generations are observed from the aggregated
31 statistics in recent studies. To explore the change in SI across transmission generations, we develop a
32 likelihood-based statistical inference framework to examine and quantify the change in SI. The
33 COVID-19 contact tracing surveillance data in Hong Kong are used for exemplification. We find
34 that the individual SI of COVID-19 is likely to shrink with a rate of 0.72 per generation and 95%CI:
35 (0.54, 0.96) as the transmission generation increases. We speculate that the shrinkage in SI is an
36 outcome of competition among multiple candidate infectors within a cluster of cases. The shrinkage
37 in SI may speed up the transmission process, and thus the nonpharmaceutical interventive strategies
38 are crucially important to mitigate the COVID-19 epidemic.

39

40 **Keywords:** COVID-19; serial interval; transmission generation; contact tracing; statistical modelling.

41

42 1 Introduction

43 The transmission dynamics of an infectious disease are largely determined by the pathogen's
44 infectiousness and the course of the transmission [1-9]. The serial interval (SI), which is defined as
45 the time interval between the symptoms onset dates of an infector and of the associated infectee [10-
46 13], is widely used to measure the duration of the transmission generation. As the most efficient
47 proxy of the generation time (GT) [14], SI is one of the crucial epidemiological parameters in
48 shaping the transmission process as well as the growth patterns of an outbreak [7, 9, 15, 16].

49 As a contagious disease, the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), caused by the severe
50 acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), was firstly reported in 2019 [17-21], and
51 rapidly spread to over 200 countries and territories, which poses a serious threat to global health. In
52 response to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared a
53 public health emergency of international concern on January 30, 2020 [22]. As of September 25,
54 2020, there have been over 31 million confirmed COVID-19 cases worldwide with over 0.9 million
55 associated deaths [23].

56 To date, the transmission process of COVID-19 has been characterized and reconstructed
57 both empirically and theoretically [6, 8, 18, 24-29]. In a number of existing literature, SI is
58 commonly considered following a universal distribution at the population (or herd) scale for many
59 well-known respiratory infectious diseases [13, 30-32], which also occurs for COVID-19 [6, 18, 33,
60 34]. Recently, two studies, both of which are based on the aggregated SI observations, reported that
61 SI appears with slight discrepancies across different transmission generations [35, 36]. Inspiring by
62 their findings, we suspect there may exist a solid difference in the infector's mean SI in consecutive
63 generations in a transmission chain.

64 In this study, we develop a statistical framework to explore the change in SI across
65 transmission generations. For exemplification, we quantify the change in SI by using the COVID-19
66 contact tracing surveillance data in Hong Kong. We explore the mechanism that drives the change in
67 SI, and we also demonstrate its effects on shaping the transmission of COVID-19.

68 2 Methods

69 2.1 Conceptualization and statistical parameterization

70 We denote the SI of an infected individual, i.e., infector, by τ that follows a probability
71 density function (PDF) $h(\tau)$ with mean μ and standard deviation (SD) σ . A transmission chain is
72 composed by two consecutive transmission pairs, in which the infectee in the former transmission
73 pair acts as the infector in the latter transmission pair, see Fig 1. For convenience, we name the SI in
74 the former transmission pair by former SI and denoted by $\tau^{(F)}$, and the SI in the latter transmission
75 pair by latter SI and denoted by $\tau^{(L)}$. Here, we note that the superscript, i.e., '(F)' or '(L)', is used
76 merely as a label instead of as a power.

77 We explore the changing patterns in SI across transmission generations. In the same
78 transmission chain, an intuitive statistical relation between $\tau^{(F)}$ and $\tau^{(L)}$ in Eqn (1),

$$\mathbf{E}[\tau^{(L)}] = \lambda \cdot \mathbf{E}[\tau^{(F)}], \quad (1)$$

is considered, where $\mathbf{E}[\cdot]$ denotes the expectation function. The parameter λ is the change ratio between the means of two consecutive SIs, which is a positive constant to be determined. Straightforwardly, there exist iterative changes in mean SI across transmission generations, if $\lambda \neq 1$, while the mean SI may be a constant, if $\lambda = 1$. Hence, the relation in Eqn (1) can be examined by checking whether $\lambda = 1$ holds under the null hypothesis.

2.2 Likelihood-based inference framework

With the PDF $h(\tau)$ for the individual SI, the (baseline) likelihood framework, denoted by L_0 , can be formulated in Eqn (2). That is

$$L_0(\lambda) = \prod_i \left[h^{(L)}(\tau_i^{(L)} | \lambda, \tau_i^{(F)}) \cdot h^{(F)}(\tau_i^{(F)} | \lambda, \tau_i^{(L)}) \right], \quad (2)$$

where the subscript i denotes the i -th transmission chain. For $h^{(L)}(\cdot | \lambda, \tau^{(F)})$, the mean of $h^{(L)}$ is given as $\mu^{(L)} = \tau^{(F)} \cdot \lambda$ according to the relation in Eqn (1). By contrast, for $h^{(F)}(\cdot | \lambda, \tau^{(L)})$, the mean of $h^{(F)}$ is given as $\mu^{(F)} = \tau^{(L)} / \lambda$. The SD of $h(\cdot)$, i.e., σ , is modelled as a function of μ . Due to the lack of information about the dispersion of the individual SI, we consider three scenarios of σ that cover a wide range of the possible situations. They include

- scenario (I), a large SD: $\sigma = |\mu|$, which refers to the scale of the coefficient of variation (CV) estimated in previous studies [6, 8, 24, 26, 29, 33, 37-40] and considered as an upper bound of SD;
- scenario (II), a moderate SD: $\sigma^2 = |\mu|$, which is assumed having a Poisson-like feature; and
- scenario (III), a small SD: $\sigma = 1$, which is assumed and considered as a lower bound of SD.

With the mean and SD, the function $h(\cdot)$ can be formulated by some widely adopted PDFs. We consider three different PDFs. They are

- Normal distribution as a representative of symmetric distributions defined on all real numbers [8, 35, 37-39, 41, 42];
- Gumbel distribution as a representative of asymmetric distributions defined on all real numbers [8, 37]; and
- Gamma distribution as a representative of asymmetric distributions defined on positive numbers [6, 8, 13, 18, 28-30, 33-35, 37, 38, 40, 43-45].

We select the scenario of SD and distribution of $h(\cdot)$ according to the fitting performance in terms of the Akaike information criterion with a correction for small sample sizes (AICc).

In addition, as pointed out in [33], the baseline likelihood in Eqn (2) might lead to an underestimation of SI due to the interval-censoring issue. Hence, according to the truncation scheme previously developed in [40], which accounts for the effects of each infector's isolation, we adjust for the right truncation bias by an improved likelihood function, L , in Eqn (3). We have

$$L(\lambda) = \prod_i \left[\frac{h^{(L)}(\tau_i^{(L)} | \lambda, \tau_i^{(F)})}{H^{(L)}(d_i^{(L)} | \lambda, \tau_i^{(F)})} \cdot \frac{h^{(F)}(\tau_i^{(F)} | \lambda, \tau_i^{(L)})}{H^{(F)}(d_i^{(F)} | \lambda, \tau_i^{(L)})} \right], \quad (3)$$

111 where $H(\cdot)$ is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of $h(\cdot)$, and the letter d denotes the duration
 112 from the onset date of an infector to the person's isolation date. All other notations are the same as
 113 those in Eqn (2).

114 The parameter λ is estimated under both truncated and non-truncated schemes by using the
 115 maximum likelihood estimation (MLE). The AICc is employed for model selection. The 95%
 116 confidence interval (95%CI) is calculated by using the profile likelihood estimation framework with
 117 the cutoff threshold of a Chi-square quantile [46-50].

118 All analyses are conducted in the **R** statistical software (version 3.5.1), and no specific
 119 package is used.

120 2.3 COVID-19 surveillance data in Hong Kong

121 The COVID-19 surveillance data are originally released by the Centre for Health Protection
 122 (CHP) of Hong Kong [51], and used in [24] previously. According to the data description in [24], a
 123 total of 1038 laboratory-confirmed SARS-CoV-2 infections as of May 7, 2020, were initially
 124 screened. In Hong Kong, each contact of a confirmed COVID-19 case, defined as who has prolonged
 125 face-to-face interaction with a case, is traced and mandatorily quarantined for 14 days, regardless of
 126 symptom appearance. Then, each transmission pair, i.e., the 'infector-and-infectee' pair, can be
 127 reconstructed from the contact tracing records. A total of 169 transmission pairs including 27
 128 asymptomatic transmission pairs for either infector or infectee, which are directly collected via
 129 https://github.com/dcadam/covid-19-sse/blob/master/data/transmission_pairs.csv, are identified for
 130 further screening.

131 In this study, we focus on the $(169 - 27 =) 142$ symptomatic transmission pairs in Hong
 132 Kong. We identify the infectee who acts as an infector in other transmission pairs, i.e., the
 133 'secondary case' in Fig 1, by matching all combinations of the 142 transmission pairs. We
 134 reconstructed the transmission chain with 3 generations including primary case, secondary case, and
 135 tertiary case, which is illustrated as the 'secondary case' in Fig 1. A total of 21 transmission chains
 136 are extracted, and presented in Fig 2.

137 Since the isolation period of each infector is unavailable, we consider the case confirmation
 138 date as a proxy of the isolation starting time with the presumption that the isolation starts
 139 immediately after confirmation. Hence, the change ratio of SI, λ , can be estimated from these
 140 transmission chain data in Hong Kong by using the analytical framework in Section 2.2.

141 2.4 Sensitivity analysis

142 To evaluate the estimating sensitivity, an alternative formulation, similar to the relationship in
 143 Eqn (1), is adopted to repeat the estimation with the dataset from Hong Kong. The alternative
 144 relationship between the former and latter SIs is formulated in Eqn (4).

$$\mathbf{E}[\tau^{(L)}] = \lambda \cdot [\mathbf{E}[\tau^{(F)}] - T_c] + T_c, \quad (4)$$

145 where the term $T_c (\geq 0)$ indicates the lower bound of the SI as generation increases. Other terms have
 146 the same meanings as those in Eqn (1). Straightforwardly, Eqn (1) and Eqn (4) will be equivalent, if
 147 $T_c = 0$. Thus, the intuition of Eqn (4) is of the same fashion as that of the Eqn (1).

148 We estimate both T_c and λ simultaneously with the likelihood profiles and estimation
 149 procedures in Section 2.2. The model selection is conducted referring to the lowest AICc. We check
 150 the consistency of the λ estimates, and whether T_c is significantly larger than 0.

151 *2.5 Exploring the mechanisms behind change in SI*

152 In this section, we develop statistical models to explore two possible, but not verified,
 153 mechanisms behind the change in SI, their effects in shaping the transmission process, and their
 154 reasonability.

155 2.5.1 Exploration #1: changes in latent period and infectious period

156 In exploration #1, we consider a hypothetical scenario that the change in SI is an intrinsic
 157 feature of the pathogen, which is due to change in latent period and infectious period across cluster
 158 generations. Then, according to the classic ‘susceptible-exposed-infectious-removed’ (SEIR)
 159 framework, where exponential distributions are assumed for most of the epidemiological parameters
 160 [52-56], we have

$$X^{(k)} + Y^{(k)} = \mathbf{E}[\tau^{(k)}], \text{ and } X^{(k+1)} + Y^{(k+1)} = \mathbf{E}[\tau^{(k+1)}], \quad (4)$$

161 where X (unit: day) denotes the mean latent period, and Y (unit: day) denotes the infectious period.
 162 The superscript (k) is the label of transmission generation rather than a power. This relationship is
 163 derived in [54] theoretically, and adopted in [15, 52, 53, 55, 56]. When $\lambda < 1$, we assume $0 \leq X^{(k+1)} \leq$

164 $X^{(k)}$, and $0 \leq Y^{(k+1)} \leq Y^{(k)}$ for Eqn (4). We define $\rho^{(k)} = \frac{Y^{(k)} - Y^{(k+1)}}{E[\tau^{(k)}] - E[\tau^{(k+1)}]} \times 100\%$ as the percentage of SI
 165 reduction due to the reduction in infectious period.

166 We explore the potential effects of the change in SI on the individual reproduction number,
 167 R , across transmission generations. Referring to the SEIR framework, the individual reproduction
 168 number can be modelled as the product of the mean effective contact rate and the mean infectious
 169 period, i.e., $R^{(k)} = \beta^{(k)} \cdot Y^{(k)}$ for the infector in the k -th generation in a transmission chain. Here, β (unit:
 170 per day) denotes the effective contact rate.

171 By fixing β as a constant, we explore the effects of the change in τ on R in the k -th
 172 transmission generation. To set up, we fix the mean SI of the infector, $\mathbf{E}[\tau^{(k=0)}]$, at 7.5 days referring
 173 to the estimates from the earliest COVID-19 data [18], and the mean latent period, $X^{(k=0)}$, at 3.3 days
 174 [45, 57] for the initial, i.e., 0-th, generation. Thus, the mean infectious period, $Y^{(k=0)}$, is derived at $(7.5$
 175 $- 3.3 =) 4.3$ days by using Eqn (4), which is in line with the results in literatures [55, 57, 58]. We
 176 further fix the initial individual reproduction number, $R^{(k=0)}$, at 2.2, which is generally consistent with
 177 previous estimates [3, 6, 8, 18, 19, 37, 40, 52, 55, 59-62]. Thus, the relationship among k , ρ , and R
 178 can be solved numerically.

179 2.5.2 Exploration #2: competition among multiple candidate infectors

180 In exploration #2, we consider a statistical mechanism that the shrinkage in SI may be an
 181 outcome of a competition among multiple candidate infectors. The SI is recorded pairwise as the
 182 duration between onset dates of an infectee and the infector who triggers the infection. In a cluster of
 183 cases, contacts are likely to occur in most pairs of infected and susceptible individuals
 184 simultaneously. The candidate infector is defined as those cases who contribute to the exposure of an

185 infectee but may or may not trigger the infection eventually. We speculate the competitions among
186 multiple candidate infectors may shorten the SI.

187 For the competition among a total of J candidate infectors for one infectee, the onset time, t ,
188 of the infectee who is triggered by the j -th candidate infector follows a PDF denoted by $g(t = t_j + \tau_j)$.
189 Here, t_j denotes onset date of the j -th candidate infector, and τ_j denotes the candidate SI, if occurs,
190 between the j -th candidate infector and the infectee. The parameter t_j is observable from the
191 surveillance data, and thus is considered as a constant. The parameter τ_j is modelled as independent
192 and identically distributed (IID) random variable following the PDF $h(\tau)$ as defined in Section 2.1.
193 Hence, the $g(t)$ appears a shifted version of $h(\tau)$ with a shift term of $-t_j$. The candidate infector who
194 triggers the infectee at the earliest is recognized as the infector. Thus, the observed SI of the infectee
195 is τ_j that associates with the smallest $(t_j + \tau_j)$ for all indexes j .

196 We simulate this candidate infector competition framework stochastically. To set up, we
197 consider a cluster starting with one seed case whose onset date is day (or time) 0. The PDF $h(\tau)$ is
198 modelled as a Gamma distribution with mean 5.5 and standard deviation (SD) 3.3 days, which is in
199 line with many existing estimates [29, 43-45]. With h , the PDF g can also be determined by shifting.
200 For the reproducibility, we restrict the number of offsprings generated by each infector following a
201 Poisson distribution with rate parameter fixed at 2.2, which is consistent to the predefined value of
202 reproduction number (R) in Section 2.5.1. The number of offsprings can also be directly assigned
203 manually. Specially, the number of offsprings from the initial seed case, namely number of primary
204 offsprings, is a criterion to identify the superspreading events, and thus is importance to explore its
205 effect in shaping SI across transmission generation. For simplicity, we neglect the isolation in the
206 simulation framework.

207 During the model simulation, we record the cluster size in terms of the cumulative number of
208 cases, onset dates of each case, infector of each infectee (except the initial seed case), SI, generation
209 of cases, and number of offsprings for each infector. The generation of cases is traced by the
210 transmission chain linked to the initial seed case, and we defined the generation of initial seed case as
211 generation 0. For convenience, the transmission generation between a case in generation 0 and
212 another case in generation 1 as the first transmission generation, and thus the index of transmission
213 generation can be ranked subsequently.

214 For each simulation, we extract the SIs from first and second transmission generations, and
215 treat these consecutive SIs as pairs of former and latter SIs that is illustrated in Fig 1. We generate 30
216 pairs of former and latter SIs, and conduct the estimation of λ using the framework in Eqn (2). We
217 explore the effects of cluster size, number of primary offsprings and generation numbers in changing
218 the scale of SI.

219 3 Results and discussion

220 For the 21 identified COVID-19 transmission chains in Hong Kong, the pairs of former and
221 latter SIs are presented in Fig 2. We report the descriptive statistics as follows. For the former SI, we
222 report a mean of 5.4 days, median of 6.0 days, interquartile range (IQR) between 3.0 and 7.0 days,
223 95% centile from 1.5 to 10.5 days, 95% percentile of 8.0 days, and a range from 1.0 to 13.0 days. For
224 the latter SI, we report a mean of 4.8 days, median of 4.0 days, IQR between 3.0 and 7.0 days, 95%
225 centile from 1.0 to 9.5 days, 95% percentile of 9.0 days, and a range from 1.0 to 10.0 days. We

observe that the mean (and median) SI decreases when generation increases, and this finding was reported previously in [35, 36]. With the sample means, we calculate the ratio of latter SI over former SI at $(4.8 / 5.4 =) 0.89$, which is roughly the same scale as 0.73 in [35] and 0.94 or 0.75 in [36]. Empirically, the pairwise difference of latter SI minus former SI has a mean of -0.7 days, median of 0.0 day, and IQR between -3.0 and 2.0 days. The pairwise ratio of latter SI over former SI has a mean of 1.1, median of 1.0, and IQR between 0.5 and 1.5. By using the nonparametric bootstrapping approach, the crude change ratio of SI across generations is calculated at 1.00 with 95%CI: (0.57, 1.43).

Considering the theoretical probability profile of individual SI in Eqn (2), we estimate the λ at 0.77 and 95%CI: (0.51, 1.16) selected with the lowest AICc among all non-truncated scenarios, see Table 1. For all scenarios in Table 1, we find that the Gamma distribution with $\sigma^2 = |\mu|$ outperformed against other scenarios in terms of the lowest AICc. As such, we estimate the λ at 0.72 and 95%CI: (0.54, 0.96), which are considered as the main results. Besides the fitting performance, we also consider the biological feasibility of probability profile in governing the real-world observations of the SI of COVID-19. Referring to the previous literatures [8, 24, 29, 37-39, 44, 45], the SI of COVID-19 might be negative, i.e., $\tau < 0$. Although the Gamma distribution outperforms, the negative SI observations cannot be governed by a Gamma-distributed $h(\cdot)$. In this case, the scenario with the second lowest AICc is considered as another main results. As such, we estimate the λ at 0.74 and 95%CI: (0.61, 0.91) with a Gumbel distribution, which is also highlighted in Table 1. The best fitting performance from Gamma distribution is probably because all our SI observations appear positive, see Fig 2. We remark that with negative SI observations, Gumbel distribution is likely to yield a better fitting performance than Gamma distribution.

Consistently, the estimates of λ using Gamma and Gumbel distributions are almost the same, and significantly less than 1. Thus, the individual SI is likely to shrink when the transmission generation increases with rate at 0.72 per generation, which, to the best of our knowledge, is the first study quantifying this relation. According to our truncated likelihood framework in Eqn (3), the estimated shrinkage can be understood in regard to the intrinsic SI [33, 40], of which the “distribution depends only on the average infectiousness of an individual” as defined in [15]. Hence, the shrinkage in intrinsic SI is interpreted as an across-generation feature, and is unlikely due to the effects of nonpharmaceutical interventions, which may shorten the realized SI as pointed out in [37, 63-65]. Regardless of the number of direct offspring in each generation, the shrinkage in SI implies that the transmission is likely to occur more rapidly since the exposure of each infector. Then, the infectee is more likely exposed before the symptom onset of the infector in the late generations, comparing to the situation in the early generations. In other words, pre-symptomatic transmission may occur more frequently in the late generations. In addition, we find both main estimates of λ are under the scenario (II) of individual SI’s SD (σ). Since the SIs from a population may have an SD as in scenario (I), this finding indicates that the SI of a population is more dispersive than the individual SI.

For the sensitivity analysis, the relationship in Eqn (4) is examined. We find that, consistent with the main results, the Gamma-distributed $h(\cdot)$ with scenario (II) of σ and likelihood truncation outperforms among other scenarios, see Fig 3. The SI lower bound, T_c , is estimated at 0.0 exactly,

267 which means Eqn (4) becomes equivalent to Eqn (1) and implies relationship in Eqn (1) holds
268 robustly.

269 We explore the impacts of the shrinkage in SI in shaping the individual reproduction number
270 modelled as exploration #1 in Section 2.5.1. We find that the R decreases when the transmission
271 generations increase, see Fig 4. With a higher percentage of the reduction in SI due to the reduction
272 in infectious period (ρ), the R may decrease more rapidly. When ρ is fixed at 0.5, 50% of the
273 reduction in SI is from the reduction in infectious period (Y), and the remaining 50% is from the
274 reduction in latent period (X). With the conditions for COVID-19 in Section 2.5.1 and λ at 0.72 per
275 generation, we calculate the R of 1.1 in the second generation and of 0.9 in the third generation. The
276 total number of offsprings seeded by an index case, commonly known as patient zero (in generation
277 zero), will be 15.5 on average, if no control measure is implemented, which is 7.7-fold of the initial
278 reproduction number as fixed at 2.2. Therefore, both timely and effective case's isolation and close
279 contact's quarantine are crucial to mitigate the COVID-19 epidemics.

280 As a geometric sequence, if the absolute value of the common ratio, i.e., λ , is less than one,
281 the sequence defined in Eqn (1) will converge. Thus, the mean SI will decrease and approach 0
282 theoretically, when the number of transmission generations becomes sufficiently large. However,
283 under exploration #1, there occurs a discrepancy as follows.

284 When the SI decreases, the individual R of each infector will also decrease, which leads to an
285 outcome that the transmission of COVID-19 may vanish after a number of generations.
286 However, as a matter of fact, the pandemic of COVID-19 continuous and to date, still
287 maintains growing patterns in the epidemic curve.

288 We notice this discrepancy between the theoretical outcome from exploration #1 and the real-world
289 observation.

290 For the suspected candidate infector competition mechanism proposed as exploration #2 in
291 Section 2.5.2, we find the shrinkage in SI is likely occur when the cluster size increases, see Fig 5,
292 and when the number of offsprings increases, see Fig 6. Under the mechanism in exploration #2, the
293 mean individual reproduction number holds as a constant. In other words, the outbreak maintains
294 with substantial offspring cases in each transmission generation, and thus the discrepancy occurring
295 under exploration #1 vanishes. Therefore, we consider exploration #2 as the main discussion, which
296 may be more reasonable than exploration #1.

297 We observe the SI shrinks as generation increases, and approaches a boundary level in the
298 late generations, see Fig 7. As such, we argue that the alternative relation in Eqn (4) may be more
299 biologically reasonable, even though the simpler formulation in Eqn (1) slightly outperforms. We
300 speculate the outperformance of Eqn (1) is possibly because most transmission chains (16 out of 21)
301 are the chains of cases from 'zero-first-second' generations in each cluster of COVID-19 cases. This
302 character of our COVID-19 dataset makes the simple geometric relation in Eqn (1) an optimal fit to
303 the observations from early generations. In other words, if more SI observations from late
304 generations would be included, Eqn (4) may replace Eqn (1) as the optimal relationship. To verify,
305 we repeat the estimation in Section 2.4 by solely using the $(21 - 16 =) 5$ transmission chains that are
306 from late generations, i.e., secondary, tertiary, or quaternary. In this case, we estimate the T_c at 1.4
307 days (data not shown), which indicates Eqn (4) appears more feasible than Eqn (1). With a strictly

308 positive T_c as the lower bound of mean SI, the individual R may maintain at or over a certain level
309 such that the COVID-19 outbreak continues. Hence, we remark that the data with more generations
310 observed from each transmission chain will probably improve the estimation of the change in SI
311 across generations.

312 Within a cluster of COVID-19 cases, the shrinkage in SI may speed up the transmission
313 process, and thus result in increase in growth rate of the epidemic curve. The nonpharmaceutical
314 interventive strategies, which can cut off the transmission chain, e.g., isolation, quarantine, social
315 distancing, and personal protective equipment (PPE), are thus crucially important to mitigate the
316 cluster size and flattening the epidemic curve. The statistical mechanism in exploration #2 is
317 applicable to study the transmission dynamics of other infectious diseases. Future studies on
318 verifying the exploration #2, or on exploring other clinical or biological mechanisms that affects the
319 individual SI across transmission generations are desired.

320 **4 Conclusions**

321 The individual SI of COVID-19 is likely to shrink as the transmission generation increases.
322 We speculate that the shrinkage in SI is an outcome of competition among multiple candidate
323 infectors within a cluster of cases. The shrinkage in SI may speed up the transmission process, and
324 thus the nonpharmaceutical interventive strategies are crucially important to mitigate the epidemic.

325

326

327 **Declarations**

328 **Ethics approval, consent to participate, and consent for publication**

329 All data used in this work are publicly available, and thus neither ethical approval nor consent is
330 applicable.

331 **Availability of materials**

332 The COVID-19 surveillance data are collected via
333 https://github.com/dcadam/covid-19-sse/blob/master/data/transmission_pairs.csv, which are
334 originally released by the Centre for Health Protection (CHP) of Hong Kong [51] and previously
335 used in [24].

336 **Funding**

337 DH was supported by General Research Fund (grant number: 15205119) of the Research Grants
338 Council (RGC) of Hong Kong, China, and Alibaba (China) Co. Ltd. Collaborative Research project.
339 YC and WW were supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (grant numbers
340 61672013, and 12071173), and the Huaian Key Laboratory for Infectious Diseases Control and
341 Prevention (HAP201704).

342 **Acknowledgements**

343 None.

344 **Disclaimer**

345 The funding agencies had no role in the design and conduct of the study; collection, management,
346 analysis, and interpretation of the data; preparation, review, or approval of the manuscript; or
347 decision to submit the manuscript for publication.

348 **Conflict of interests**

349 DH received funding from Alibaba (China) Co. Ltd. Collaborative Research project. MHW is a
350 shareholder of Beth Bioinformatics Co., Ltd. Other authors declared no competing interests.

351 **Authors' contributions**

352 SZ conceived the study, carried out the analysis, and drafted the first manuscript. SZ and DH
353 discussed the results. All authors critically read and revised the manuscript, and gave final approval
354 for publication.

355

356

357 References


- 358 1. Tuite AR, Fisman DN: **Reporting, Epidemic Growth, and Reproduction Numbers for the 2019 Novel**
359 **Coronavirus (2019-nCoV) Epidemic.** *Annals of internal medicine* 2020, **172**(8):567-568.
- 360 2. Zhao S, Cao P, Gao D, Zhuang Z, Cai Y, Ran J, Chong MKC, Wang K, Lou Y, Wang W *et al*: **Serial**
361 **interval in determining the estimation of reproduction number of the novel coronavirus disease**
362 **(COVID-19) during the early outbreak.** *J Travel Med* 2020, **27**(3).
- 363 3. Riou J, Althaus CL: **Pattern of early human-to-human transmission of Wuhan 2019 novel**
364 **coronavirus (2019-nCoV), December 2019 to January 2020.** *Euro surveillance : bulletin Europeen sur*
365 *les maladies transmissibles = European communicable disease bulletin* 2020, **25**(4).
- 366 4. Kutter JS, Spronken MI, Fraaij PL, Fouchier RA, Herfst S: **Transmission routes of respiratory viruses**
367 **among humans.** *Curr Opin Virol* 2018, **28**:142-151.
- 368 5. Zhao S: **To avoid the noncausal association between environmental factor and COVID-19 when**
369 **using aggregated data: Simulation-based counterexamples for demonstration.** *Sci Total Environ*
370 2020:141590.
- 371 6. He X, Lau EHY, Wu P, Deng X, Wang J, Hao X, Lau YC, Wong JY, Guan Y, Tan X: **Temporal dynamics in**
372 **viral shedding and transmissibility of COVID-19.** *Nat Med* 2020:1-4.
- 373 7. Wallinga J, Lipsitch M: **How generation intervals shape the relationship between growth rates and**
374 **reproductive numbers.** *Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences* 2007, **274**(1609):599-
375 604.
- 376 8. Xu XK, Liu XF, Wu Y, Ali ST, Du Z, Bosetti P, Lau EHY, Cowling BJ, Wang L: **Reconstruction of**
377 **Transmission Pairs for novel Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) in mainland China: Estimation**
378 **of Super-spreading Events, Serial Interval, and Hazard of Infection.** *Clin Infect Dis* 2020.
- 379 9. Yan P: **Separate roles of the latent and infectious periods in shaping the relation between the basic**
380 **reproduction number and the intrinsic growth rate of infectious disease outbreaks.** *Journal of*
381 *Theoretical Biology* 2008, **251**(2):238-252.
- 382 10. Fine PE: **The interval between successive cases of an infectious disease.** *American journal of*
383 *epidemiology* 2003, **158**(11):1039-1047.
- 384 11. White LF, Wallinga J, Finelli L, Reed C, Riley S, Lipsitch M, Pagano M: **Estimation of the reproductive**
385 **number and the serial interval in early phase of the 2009 influenza A/H1N1 pandemic in the USA.**
386 *Influenza Other Respir Viruses* 2009, **3**(6):267-276.
- 387 12. Milwid R, Steriu A, Arino J, Heffernan J, Hyder A, Schanzer D, Gardner E, Haworth-Brockman M,
388 Isfeld-Kiely H, Langley JM *et al*: **Toward Standardizing a Lexicon of Infectious Disease Modeling**
389 **Terms.** *Front Public Health* 2016, **4**(213):213.
- 390 13. Vink MA, Bootsma MC, Wallinga J: **Serial intervals of respiratory infectious diseases: a systematic**
391 **review and analysis.** *American journal of epidemiology* 2014, **180**(9):865-875.
- 392 14. Wallinga J, Teunis P: **Different epidemic curves for severe acute respiratory syndrome reveal**
393 **similar impacts of control measures.** *American journal of epidemiology* 2004, **160**(6):509-516.
- 394 15. Champredon D, Dushoff J: **Intrinsic and realized generation intervals in infectious-disease**
395 **transmission.** *Proceedings Biological sciences* 2015, **282**(1821):20152026.
- 396 16. Kenah E, Lipsitch M, Robins JM: **Generation interval contraction and epidemic data analysis.**
397 *Mathematical biosciences* 2008, **213**(1):71-79.
- 398 17. Huang C, Wang Y, Li X, Ren L, Zhao J, Hu Y, Zhang L, Fan G, Xu J, Gu X *et al*: **Clinical features of**
399 **patients infected with 2019 novel coronavirus in Wuhan, China.** *Lancet (London, England)* 2020,
400 **395**(10223):497-506.
- 401 18. Li Q, Guan X, Wu P, Wang X, Zhou L, Tong Y, Ren R, Leung KSM, Lau EHY, Wong JY *et al*: **Early**
402 **Transmission Dynamics in Wuhan, China, of Novel Coronavirus-Infected Pneumonia.** *N Engl J Med*
403 2020, **382**(13):1199-1207.
- 404 19. Zhao S, Musa SS, Lin Q, Ran J, Yang G, Wang W, Lou Y, Yang L, Gao D, He D *et al*: **Estimating the**
405 **Unreported Number of Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV) Cases in China in the First Half of January**
406 **2020: A Data-Driven Modelling Analysis of the Early Outbreak.** *J Clin Med* 2020, **9**(2):388.

- 407 20. Leung K, Wu JT, Liu D, Leung GM: **First-wave COVID-19 transmissibility and severity in China**
408 **outside Hubei after control measures, and second-wave scenario planning: a modelling impact**
409 **assessment.** *Lancet (London, England)* 2020, **395**(10233):1382-1393.
- 410 21. Parry J: **China coronavirus: cases surge as official admits human to human transmission.** *BMJ*
411 *(Clinical research ed)* 2020, **368**:m236.
- 412 22. **Statement on the second meeting of the International Health Regulations Emergency Committee**
413 **regarding the outbreak of novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV), World Health Organization (WHO).**
414 [[https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/30-01-2020-statement-on-the-second-meeting-of-the-](https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/30-01-2020-statement-on-the-second-meeting-of-the-international-health-regulations-(2005)-emergency-committee-regarding-the-outbreak-of-novel-coronavirus-(2019-ncov))
415 [international-health-regulations-\(2005\)-emergency-committee-regarding-the-outbreak-of-novel-](https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/30-01-2020-statement-on-the-second-meeting-of-the-international-health-regulations-(2005)-emergency-committee-regarding-the-outbreak-of-novel-coronavirus-(2019-ncov))
416 [coronavirus-\(2019-ncov\)](https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/30-01-2020-statement-on-the-second-meeting-of-the-international-health-regulations-(2005)-emergency-committee-regarding-the-outbreak-of-novel-coronavirus-(2019-ncov))]
- 417 23. **Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV) situation reports, released by the World Health Organization**
418 **(WHO).** [<https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/situation-reports>]
- 419 24. Adam DC, Wu P, Wong JY, Lau EHY, Tsang TK, Cauchemez S, Leung GM, Cowling BJ: **Clustering and**
420 **superspreading potential of SARS-CoV-2 infections in Hong Kong.** *Nat Med* 2020.
- 421 25. Luo L, Liu D, Liao X, Wu X, Jing Q, Zheng J, Liu F, Yang S, Bi H, Li Z *et al*: **Contact Settings and Risk for**
422 **Transmission in 3410 Close Contacts of Patients With COVID-19 in Guangzhou, China : A**
423 **Prospective Cohort Study.** *Annals of internal medicine* 2020.
- 424 26. Kwok KO, Wong VWY, Wei WI, Wong SYS, Tang JW: **Epidemiological characteristics of the first 53**
425 **laboratory-confirmed cases of COVID-19 epidemic in Hong Kong, 13 February 2020.** *Euro*
426 *surveillance : bulletin Europeen sur les maladies transmissibles = European communicable disease*
427 *bulletin* 2020, **25**(16):2000155.
- 428 27. Wu J, Huang Y, Tu C, Bi C, Chen Z, Luo L, Huang M, Chen M, Tan C, Wang Z *et al*: **Household**
429 **Transmission of SARS-CoV-2, Zhuhai, China, 2020.** *Clin Infect Dis* 2020.
- 430 28. Ren X, Li Y, Yang X, Li Z, Cui J, Zhu A, Zhao H, Yu J, Nie T, Ren M *et al*: **Evidence for pre-symptomatic**
431 **transmission of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) in China.** *Influenza Other Respir Viruses* 2020.
- 432 29. Tindale LC, Stockdale JE, Coombe M, Garlock ES, Lau WYV, Saraswat M, Zhang L, Chen D, Wallinga J,
433 Colijn C: **Evidence for transmission of COVID-19 prior to symptom onset.** *Elife* 2020, **9**:e57149.
- 434 30. Cowling BJ, Fang VJ, Riley S, Malik Peiris JS, Leung GM: **Estimation of the serial interval of influenza.**
435 *Epidemiology (Cambridge, Mass)* 2009, **20**(3):344-347.
- 436 31. Leung GM, Hedley AJ, Ho L-M, Chau P, Wong IOL, Thach TQ, Ghani AC, Donnelly CA, Fraser C, Riley S:
437 **The epidemiology of severe acute respiratory syndrome in the 2003 Hong Kong epidemic: an**
438 **analysis of all 1755 patients.** *Annals of internal medicine* 2004, **141**(9):662-673.
- 439 32. Assiri A, McGeer A, Perl TM, Price CS, Al Rabeeah AA, Cummings DA, Alabdullatif ZN, Assad M,
440 Almulhim A, Makhdoom H *et al*: **Hospital outbreak of Middle East respiratory syndrome**
441 **coronavirus.** *N Engl J Med* 2013, **369**(5):407-416.
- 442 33. Nishiura H, Linton NM, Akhmetzhanov AR: **Serial interval of novel coronavirus (COVID-19)**
443 **infections.** *Int J Infect Dis* 2020, **93**:284-286.
- 444 34. Wang K, Zhao S, Liao Y, Zhao T, Wang X, Zhang X, Jiao H, Li H, Yin Y, Wang MH *et al*: **Estimating the**
445 **serial interval of the novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) based on the public surveillance data in**
446 **Shenzhen, China, from 19 January to 22 February 2020.** *Transbound Emerg Dis* 2020.
- 447 35. Ma S, Zhang J, Zeng M, Yun Q, Guo W, Zheng Y, Zhao S, Wang MH, Yang Z: **Epidemiological**
448 **parameters of coronavirus disease 2019: a pooled analysis of publicly reported individual data of**
449 **1155 cases from seven countries.** *J Med Internet Res* 2020:Accepted.
- 450 36. Li M, Liu K, Song Y, Wang M, Wu J: **Serial interval and generation interval for respectively the**
451 **imported and local infectors estimated using reported contact-tracing data of COVID-19 in China.**
452 *medRxiv* 2020.
- 453 37. Ali ST, Wang L, Lau EHY, Xu X-K, Du Z, Wu Y, Leung GM, Cowling BJ: **Serial interval of SARS-CoV-2**
454 **was shortened over time by nonpharmaceutical interventions.** *Science* 2020.
- 455 38. Du Z, Xu X, Wu Y, Wang L, Cowling BJ, Meyers LA: **Serial Interval of COVID-19 among Publicly**
456 **Reported Confirmed Cases.** *Emerg Infect Dis* 2020, **26**(6):1341-1343.

39. You C, Deng Y, Hu W, Sun J, Lin Q, Zhou F, Pang CH, Zhang Y, Chen Z, Zhou XH: **Estimation of the time-varying reproduction number of COVID-19 outbreak in China.** *Int J Hyg Environ Health* 2020, **228**:113555.
40. Zhao S, Gao D, Zhuang Z, Chong MKC, Cai Y, Ran J, Cao P, Wang K, Lou Y, Wang W *et al*: **Estimating the Serial Interval of the Novel Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19): A Statistical Analysis Using the Public Data in Hong Kong From January 16 to February 15, 2020.** *Frontiers in Physics* 2020, **8**.
41. Yang L, Dai J, Zhao J, Wang Y, Deng P, Wang J: **Estimation of incubation period and serial interval of COVID-19: analysis of 178 cases and 131 transmission chains in Hubei province, China.** *Epidemiol Infect* 2020, **148**:e117.
42. Forsberg White L, Pagano M: **A likelihood-based method for real-time estimation of the serial interval and reproductive number of an epidemic.** *Stat Med* 2008, **27**(16):2999-3016.
43. Ferretti L, Wymant C, Kendall M, Zhao L, Nurtay A, Abeler-Dorner L, Parker M, Bonsall D, Fraser C: **Quantifying SARS-CoV-2 transmission suggests epidemic control with digital contact tracing.** *Science* 2020, **368**(6491):eabb6936.
44. Ganyani T, Kremer C, Chen D, Torneri A, Faes C, Wallinga J, Hens N: **Estimating the generation interval for coronavirus disease (COVID-19) based on symptom onset data, March 2020.** *Euro surveillance : bulletin Europeen sur les maladies transmissibles = European communicable disease bulletin* 2020, **25**(17):2000257.
45. Zhao S: **Estimating the time interval between transmission generations when negative values occur in the serial interval data: using COVID-19 as an example.** *Mathematical Biosciences and Engineering* 2020, **17**(4):3512-3519.
46. Fan J, Huang T: **Profile likelihood inferences on semiparametric varying-coefficient partially linear models.** *Bernoulli* 2005, **11**(6):1031-1057.
47. Zhao S, Musa SS, Meng J, Qin J, He D: **The long-term changing dynamics of dengue infectivity in Guangdong, China, from 2008-2018: a modelling analysis.** *Trans R Soc Trop Med Hyg* 2020, **114**(1):62-71.
48. Lin Q, Chiu AP, Zhao S, He D: **Modeling the spread of Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus in Saudi Arabia.** *Stat Methods Med Res* 2018, **27**(7):1968-1978.
49. Cai Y, Zhao S, Niu Y, Peng Z, Wang K, He D, Wang W: **Modelling the effects of the contaminated environments on tuberculosis in Jiangsu, China.** *J Theor Biol* 2020, **508**:110453.
50. He D, Zhao S, Lin Q, Musa SS, Stone L: **New estimates of the Zika virus epidemic attack rate in Northeastern Brazil from 2015 to 2016: A modelling analysis based on Guillain-Barre Syndrome (GBS) surveillance data.** *PLoS Negl Trop Dis* 2020, **14**(4):e0007502.
51. **Summary of data and outbreak situation of the Severe Respiratory Disease associated with a Novel Infectious Agent, Centre for Health Protection, the government of Hong Kong.** [<https://www.chp.gov.hk/en/features/102465.html>]
52. Gatto M, Bertuzzo E, Mari L, Miccoli S, Carraro L, Casagrandi R, Rinaldo A: **Spread and dynamics of the COVID-19 epidemic in Italy: Effects of emergency containment measures.** *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America* 2020, **117**(19):10484-10491.
53. Lipsitch M, Cohen T, Cooper B, Robins JM, Ma S, James L, Gopalakrishna G, Chew SK, Tan CC, Samore MH *et al*: **Transmission dynamics and control of severe acute respiratory syndrome.** *Science* 2003, **300**(5627):1966-1970.
54. Svensson A: **A note on generation times in epidemic models.** *Mathematical biosciences* 2007, **208**(1):300-311.
55. Wu JT, Leung K, Leung GM: **Nowcasting and forecasting the potential domestic and international spread of the 2019-nCoV outbreak originating in Wuhan, China: a modelling study.** *Lancet (London, England)* 2020, **395**(10225):689-697.
56. Zhao S, Stone L, Gao D, Musa SS, Chong MKC, He D, Wang MH: **Imitation dynamics in the mitigation of the novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) outbreak in Wuhan, China from 2019 to 2020.** *Ann Transl Med* 2020, **8**(7):448.

57. Li R, Pei S, Chen B, Song Y, Zhang T, Yang W, Shaman J: **Substantial undocumented infection facilitates the rapid dissemination of novel coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2).** *Science* 2020, **368**(6490):489-493.
58. Kucharski AJ, Russell TW, Diamond C, Liu Y, Edmunds J, Funk S, Eggo RM, Centre for Mathematical Modelling of Infectious Diseases C-wg: **Early dynamics of transmission and control of COVID-19: a mathematical modelling study.** *The Lancet Infectious diseases* 2020, **20**(5):553-558.
59. Chinazzi M, Davis JT, Ajelli M, Gioannini C, Litvinova M, Merler S, Pastore YPA, Mu K, Rossi L, Sun K *et al*: **The effect of travel restrictions on the spread of the 2019 novel coronavirus (COVID-19) outbreak.** *Science* 2020, **368**(6489):395-400.
60. Jung SM, Akhmetzhanov AR, Hayashi K, Linton NM, Yang Y, Yuan B, Kobayashi T, Kinoshita R, Nishiura H: **Real-Time Estimation of the Risk of Death from Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19) Infection: Inference Using Exported Cases.** *J Clin Med* 2020, **9**(2).
61. Musa SS, Zhao S, Wang MH, Habib AG, Mustapha UT, He D: **Estimation of exponential growth rate and basic reproduction number of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) in Africa.** *Infect Dis Poverty* 2020, **9**(1):96.
62. Ran J, Zhao S, Han L, Liao G, Wang K, Wang MH, He D: **A re-analysis in exploring the association between temperature and COVID-19 transmissibility: an ecological study with 154 Chinese cities.** *Eur Respir J* 2020, **56**(2):2001253.
63. Nishiura H: **Time variations in the generation time of an infectious disease: implications for sampling to appropriately quantify transmission potential.** *Mathematical Biosciences & Engineering* 2010, **7**(4):851.
64. Zhao S, Cao P, Chong MKC, Gao D, Lou Y, Ran J, Wang K, Wang W, Yang L, He D *et al*: **COVID-19 and gender-specific difference: Analysis of public surveillance data in Hong Kong and Shenzhen, China, from January 10 to February 15, 2020.** *Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol* 2020, **41**(6):750-751.
65. Park SW, Champredon D, Dushoff J: **Inferring generation-interval distributions from contact-tracing data.** *Journal of the Royal Society Interface* 2020, **17**(167):20190719.

535 **Figures**




536
537 Figure 1.

538 The illustration diagram of the timeline of a typical transmission chain.

539

540




541

542 Figure 2.

543 The timeline of the transmission chains included in this study. The dot indicates the symptoms onset
 544 date of each case. The horizontal solid line represents the duration of each serial interval (SI). The
 545 transmission chains are indexed in the sequence of the onset dates of primary, secondary, and tertiary
 546 cases, which is merely for visualization purposed and will not affect the analytical procedures.

547

548




549

550 Figure 3.

551 The Gamma-distributed log-likelihood profile of T_c (unit: day) and λ , in Eqn (4), under scenario (II)
 552 of σ , which has the best fitting performance in terms of the $AICc = 202.8$. The color scheme of the
 553 log-likelihood values is shown in the right column.

554

555



556

557 Figure 4.

558 The changing patterns of individual reproduction number (R) across the increasing transmission
 559 generations and the percentage of the reduction in SI due to the reduction in infectious period (ρ), see
 560 Section 2.5.1. For the initial (i.e., 0-th) transmission generation, the SI for the initial generation is
 561 fixed at 7.5 days, the latent period is fixed at 3.3 days, and the individual basic reproduction number
 562 (R_0) is fixed at 2.2.

563

564





Figure 5.

The likelihood profiles of λ when the cluster size is 3 (A), 6 (B), 10 (C), or 30 (D). In each panel, the green curves are the likelihood profiles of 100 set of samples (sample size of 30 for each set), and the green dots are the maximum likelihood estimates of λ .



572

573 Figure 6.


574 The likelihood profiles of λ when the number of primary offsprings is 1 (A), 3 (B), 6 (C), or 10 (D).

575 In each panel, the green curves are the likelihood profiles of 100 set of samples (sample size of 30

576 for each set), and the green dots are the maximum likelihood estimates of λ .

577

578



579

580 Figure 7.

581 The distribution of SI of infector in each (cluster) generations. The gold area indicates the
 582 distribution, the bold bars are the interquartile ranges (IQR), and the thin bars are the 95% centiles.

583

584

585 **Table**

586 Table 1.

587 Summary of the scale of change (λ) estimates (unit: per transmission generation). The shaded
588 estimates are considered as the main results.

| SD of SI (σ) | Truncation | Distribution | scale of change (λ) | AICc |
|---|------------|--------------|-------------------------------|--------|
| Large, i.e., SD = mean | No | Normal | 0.66 (0.53, 0.82) | 259.8 |
| | | Gumbel | 0.78 (0.55, 1.11) | 242.3 |
| | | Gamma | 0.77 (0.51, 1.16) | 237.7 |
| | Yes | Normal | 0.65 (0.53, 0.82) | 224.7 |
| | | Gumbel | 0.76 (0.52, 1.11) | 212.5 |
| | | Gamma | 0.72 (0.45, 1.16) | 212.1 |
| Moderate, i.e., SD ² = mean | No | Normal | 0.79 (0.66, 0.95) | 275.2 |
| | | Gumbel | 0.86 (0.74, 0.99) | 252.2 |
| | | Gamma | 0.87 (0.72, 1.05) | 242.5 |
| | Yes | Normal | 0.69 (0.55, 0.87) | 228.3 |
| | | Gumbel | 0.74 (0.61, 0.91) | 206.9 |
| | | Gamma | 0.72 (0.54, 0.96) | 200.6 |
| Small, i.e., SD = 1 | No | Normal | 0.92 (0.86, 1.00) | 552.6 |
| | | Gumbel | 0.82 (0.81, 0.83) | 6825.6 |
| | | Gamma | 0.88 (0.83, 0.92) | 634.0 |
| | Yes | Normal | 0.82 (0.73, 0.92) | 452.2 |
| | | Gumbel | 0.81 (0.80, 0.82) | 5357.1 |
| | | Gamma | 0.78 (0.73, 0.85) | 494.8 |
| crude estimate | | | 1.00 (0.57, 1.43) | none |

589

590

591